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PROCEDURAL SUBSTITUTE FOR HABEAS CORPUS: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
Introduction
The purpose of this article is to compare section 2255 of Title
28, United States Code, with habeas corpus,' distinguish it from other
post-conviction remedies, and in conclusion evaluate section 2255 in
its present position as a substitute for habeas corpus for those in
federal custody. A general history of habeas corpus and an enumera-
tion of the grounds necessary for its issuance will prove helpful since
the substantive grounds for the section are the same as those for
habeas corpus. 2 Much of the substantive law of habeas corpus has
developed from federal courts collaterally reviewing state court con-
victions, and although this article is concerned with collateral
review of federal court convictions, the state court conviction cases
are included since there seems to be no distinction in substantive
principle 3 and since they are necessary for a full understanding of
habeas corpus development.
Background
The origin of the writ of habeas corpus, "this famous bulwark
of our liberties," 4 is disputed.5 Some trace it to the Romans 1 and
others claim it is strictly of Anglo-Saxon heritage. 7 Whatever its
origin, it has become known as the "shield for the oppressed and a
barrier to the exercise of tyrannical power." 8 In view of this it is
surprising to note that it was first used to put individuals in jail 9 and
later became a writ of freedom. Despite the Magna Carta and the
early development of habeas corpus, there was no effective remedy
128 U.S.C. §2255 (1958), set out in full, note 67 infra. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241-55 (1958) contain the habeas corpus statutes.
2 See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952) ; Clough v. Hunter,
191 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1951); "The test, therefore, it seems to the Court,
is whether the issue now being raised could have been raised on an application
for a writ of habeas corpus ... ." United States v. Meyers, 84 F. Supp. 766,
767 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 181 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 917
(1949).
3 Holtzoff, Collateral Review of Convictions in Federal Courts, 25 B.U.L.
REv. 26, 35 (1945).4 J'enks, The Story of the Habeas Corpus, 18 L.Q. Rv. 64 (1902).
5 Glass, Historical Aspects of Habeas Corpus, 9 ST. JoiaN's L. Rav. 55
(1934) ; Jenks, supra note 4; Longsdorf, Habeas Corpus a Protean Writ and
Renedy, 8 F.R.D. 179 (1949).
6 Glass, supra note 5, at 55.
7 9 HoLmsworm, A HISTORY OF ENGLisH LAW 108-12 (1926 ed.).
a Glass, supra note 5, at 55.
9 Jenks, supra note 4, at 65; cited with approval, Longsdorf, supra note
5, at 179-80.
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against the unreasonable exercise of the king's power 10 until the
Petition of Right of 1628,11 which authorized habeas corpus to re-
lease prisoners arbitrarily imprisoned by the king's order.' 2  Direct
maintenance of unlimited power being so controlled, the throne re-
sorted to making use of defects still existing in the writ.' 3  The
Habeas Corpus Act of 167914 remedied these defects and pro-
vided additional protections, 15 including the use of all proper legal
processes.'6 Although there were no habeas corpus statutes in early
America, the writ was considered a basic right of all English subjects,' 7
and generally issued without question.' 8  It followed as a natural
development that when the federal government was organized, habeas
corpus became a protected constitutional privilege 19 which "shall not
be suspended, unless . . . the public Safety may require it." 20 The
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 21 provided that the writ could issue
out of a federal court only where the prisoner was in federal custody.22
Desirous of guaranteeing the war-won liberty of all persons,2 Con-
gress passed the act of 1867 24 which authorized the federal courts
to issue the writ for any detention in violation of the constitution,
laws or treaties of the United States.25
10 " ..Magna Carta and these later statutes [habeas corpus] were sup-
posed to prove that arrests by order of the king or Council were illegal. But
we have seen that this interpretation was never acquiesced in by the crown."
9 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 112.
11 16 Car. 1, c. 1088.
12 Ibid. ". . . [A]s a result of that enactment, the king lost his right to
imprison 'per speciale mandatum' without showing cause." 9 HoLDswoRTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 115 (1926 ed.); Glass, Historical Aspects of
Habeas Corpus, 9 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 55, 62 (1934). See Note, 61 HARV. L.
Rtv. 657, 658 (1948).
13 Two specific examples of this practice were: (1) imprisonment beyond
the reach of habeas corpus and (2) taking advantage of the doubtful power
to issue the writ during court vacation. See 9 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. supra
note 12, at 115-16.
1431 Car. 2, c. 2 (1679).
15 The writ now issued during court vacation, and Englishmen were not
to be imprisoned beyond the seas. Ibid. "This Act made the writ of Habeas
Corpus ad sub jiciendum the most effective weapon yet devised for the protec-
tion of the liberty of the subject, by providing both for a speedy judicial in-
quiry into the justice of any imprisonment on a criminal charge, and for a
speedy trial of prisoners remanded to await trial." 9 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit.
supra note 12, at 118. (Holdsworth also sets out the provisions of the Act.
Ibid.)
16 31 Car. 2, c. 2(1679). See Note, 61 H-RV. L. REv. 657, 658 (1948).
17 Glass, supra note 12, at 63; Note, 61 HARV. L. REv. 657, 658 (1948).
is Glass, Historical Aspects of Habeas Corpus, 9 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 55, 63
(1934).
19 U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9.
20 Ibid. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) ; Ex parte Bollman,
8 U.S. (4 Cranch.) 75 (1807).
211 Stat. 73 (1789).
22 1 Stat. 81-82 (1789). See Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103 (1845).
23 See Note, 61 HARV. L. Ray. 657, 659 (1948).
24 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
25 Ibid. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 23 (1890).
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Development of the Writ
There are few reliable rules governing the grounds necessary
for the issuance of habeas corpus.26  However, there are certain basic
precepts which serve as guides through this "untidy area of law." 27
Originally the writ would issue only where the sentencing court was
completely without jurisdiction over the person,28 place, 29 or act.30
Specific examples of a court's lack of jurisdiction were where the
indictment did not charge a crime under the laws of the United
States,31 or where there was double jeopardy.32 Also, initially, the
court was confined to the record in a habeas corpus proceeding. 33
The writ was broadened by the act of 1867 34 which provided that
the petitioner "may have a judicial inquiry . . . into the very truth
and substance of the causes of his detention, although it may become
necessary to look behind and beyond the record of his convic-
tion . . . . 3 The writ was further enlarged by United States
Supreme Court decisions holding that the writ would issue where
the sentencing court had initial jurisdiction but proceeded to
judgment in violation of petitioner's fundamental constitutional
rights.36 Most habeas corpus petitions are based on the con-
tention that petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right
to counsel. 37  However, the breach of any constitutional guar-
anty is generally sufficient ground for issuance of the writ where
the right has not been intelligently waived, and where there is
no other effective means of preserving it.38 In many cases constitu-
26 See Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947). For specific examples of
grounds necessary for issuance, see Holtzoff, Collateral Review of Convictions
in Federal Courts, 25 B.U.L. REv. 26, 49-51 (1945).
27 Sunal v. Large, supra note 26, at 184 (dissenting opinion).
2$ See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571-72 (1883) ; Horn v. Mitchell,
232 Fed. 819 (1st Cir. 1916), appeal dismissed, 243 U.S. 247 (1917).
29 See Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109
U.S. 556, 572 (1883).
30 Ex parte Rowland, 104 U.S. 604 (1881); Underhill v. Hernandez, 65
Fed. 577 (2d Cir. 1895) ; see it re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888).
32 See Van Gorder v. Johnston, 87 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1937).
32 Matter of Nielson, 131 U.S. 176, 188 (1889) ; In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274
(1886); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).33 Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830); see also Frank v.
Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 327-28 (1915).
34 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
35 Frank v. Mangum, supra note 33, at 331, quoted with approval in Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 466 (1938).36 Johnson v. Zerbst, supra note 35 (denial of counsel); Brown v. Missis-
sippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (extorted confession); Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103 (1935) (deliberate use of perjured testimony); Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86 (1923) (mob domination of trial).
37 This was first established as a ground for habeas corpus in Johnson v.
Zerbst, supra note 35; see Peters, Collateral Attack by Habeas Corpts Upon
Federal Judgments in Criminal Cases, 23 WASH. L. REv. 87, 102 (1948).
38 See Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947). "The issue here was appro-
priately raised by the habeas corpits petition. The facts relied on are dehors
1959 ]
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tional violations have been considered waived 39 where the petitioner
intelligently pleaded guilty,40 or failed to assert the violations at the
trial,41 or failed to appeal. 42  However, there are "exceptional cir-
cumstances" where collateral attack may be allowed despite these
omissions. There seem to be no real criteria for determining what
constitutes "exceptional circumstances." 43 Collateral attack by habeas
corpus has been allowed where the petitioner showed some disability
preventing him from making an intelligent waiver of his rights,44
or where the facts relied on were dehors the record and not review-
able on appeal. 45  In Sunal v. Large 46 the United States Supreme
Court mentions circumstances in which the writ bad issued without
consideration of the adequacy of appellate relief.47 However, the
the record and their effect on the judgment was not open to consideration and
review on appeal. In such circumstances the use of the writ in the federal
courts to test the constitutional validity of a conviction for crime is not re-
stricted to those cases where the judgment of conviction is void for want of
jurisdiction of the trial court to render it. It extends also to those exceptional
cases where the conviction has been in disregard of the constitutional rights
of the accused, and where the writ is the only effective means of preserving
his rights." Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942).
39 Although constitutional violations may be waived, the trial court's lack
of initial jurisdiction cannot be waived. Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1
(1959).
40Jorgensen v. Swope, 114 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1940); Cooke v. Swope.
109 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1940) ; Buckner v. Hudspeth, 105 F.2d 396 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 553 (1939); McCoy v. Hudspeth, 106 F.2d 810 (10th
Cir. 1939); cf. Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82 (1946). But see Evans
v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
41 "To allow an accused person, with actual advance knowledge that per-
jured evidence was knowingly to be used by the prosecution, to remain silent
as to that situation during the entire trial and after his conviction to attempt
to set the judgment aside by collateral attack would seriously interfere with
the proper orderly administration of criminal law." Taylor v. United States,
229 F.2d 826 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 986 (1956) (§ 2255) ; cf. cases
cited note 40 .upra.
42 Sunal v. Large, supra note 38; see Howell v. United States, 172 F.2d
213 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 906 (1949).
43 For an example of the Court's confusion as to what constitutes "excep-
tional circumstances," see Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 178-79 (1947).
44 Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941) (coerced plea of guilty);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (appeal unavailable as a practical mat-
ter because of absence of counsel) ; Evans v. Rives, supra note 40 (defendant
entered plea of guilty not fully understanding the nature of his act in doing so).
4 United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 320 U.S. 220 (1943) (per
curiam) ; Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, supra
note 44.
46 332 U.S. 174 (1947).
47 The circumstances mentioned were: "where the conviction was under a
federal statute alleged to be unconstitutional, where there was a conviction by
a federal court whose jurisdiction over the person or the offense was chal-
lenged, where the trial or sentence by a federal court violated specific consti-
tutional guarantees." Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 178-79 (1947). These
grounds labeled "exceptional circumstances" exemplify the uncertainty in the
area, since they are generally the grounds necessary for the issuance of the
writ in all circumstances.
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Court goes on to say that these circumstances cannot be considered
absolute norms, for habeas corpus is increasingly denied where ap-
pellate review was available for correction of the error.48
The courts have consistently maintained that habeas corpus is
not a substitute for appellate review.49  In Sunal v. Large 50 the
Court said:
[T]he writ is not designed for collateral review of errors of law committed
by the trial court-the existence of any evidence to support the conviction,
irregularities in the grand jury procedure, departure from a statutory grant
of time in which to prepare for trial, and other errors in trial procedure which
do not cross the jurisdictional line.51
Speaking further of errors of law committed by the trial court the
Court continued: "[I]f in such circumstances, habeas corpus could
be used to correct the error, the writ would become a delayed motion
for a new trial, renewed from time to time as the legal climate
changed." 5 2  Despite this pronouncement the Supreme Court has
reached and decided questions of statutory construction where there
had been no constitutional or jurisdictional defects at the trial, and
the questions were raised by collateral attack on consecutive sen-
tences.5 3 Although the Court has refused to directly hold that habeas
corpus or section 2255 applies in such a situation, they have con-
sidered the matter on the merits when presented under section 2255
and habeas corpus.
54
48 Sunal v. Large, mipra note 47, at 179.
49 Sunal v. Large, supra note 47; Goto v. Lane, 265 U.S. 393 (1924)
Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U.S. 420 (1912) ; In re Chapman, 156 U.S. 211 (1895);
Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 873-74 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890
(1945).
ro 332 U.S. 174 (1947).
5
" Sunal v. Large, supra note 47, at 179 (Footnotes omitted.); see Bocock
v. United States, 226 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1955) (per curiam), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 999 (1956). "Section 2255, Title 28, does not provide a method to try
over again cases in which defendants have been adjudged guilty of crime.
Whether the questions raised be as to the sufficiency of the evidence or involve
alleged error of fact or law, they may be raised only by timely appeal." Id.
at 720.
52 Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 182 (1947).5 3 Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958) (§ 2255) ; Gore v. United
States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958) (§2255); Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625(1915) (habeas corpus); Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632 (1915) (habeas
corpus). In Ladner v. United States, supra, there was no jurisdictional defect,
no violation of constitutional rights, only a possibility of an error of law, and
there had been no appeal. The Court went into the merits "without, however,
intimating any view as to the availability of a collateral remedy in another case
where that question is properly raised, and is adequately briefed and argued
in this Court." Ladner v. United States, supra, at 173. See vigorous dissent
by Mr. Justice Clark.
54 See cases cited note 53 sitpra. See United States v. Callanan, 173 F. Supp.
98 (E.D. Mo. 1959).
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Extensions and Abuses Lead to Section 2255
The scope and application of habeas corpus, already broadened
by the act of 1867,55 was further extended by a series of Supreme
Court cases holding that the writ, subject to waiver, could issue for
any conviction which violated the constitutional rights of the accused.56
These cases, particularly Johnston v. Zerbst,57 opened a "Pandora's
box" 58 from which an enormous increase of cases flowed. 59 The
doctrine of res judicata did not apply to successive habeas corpus
petitions,60 and unless the record refuted the allegations, petitioner
had to be granted a hearing at which his presence was required no
matter how frivolous his claims were.6 1 The resulting abuses were
groundless applications, 2 and successive applications on the same or
similar grounds.6 3  Because prisoners applied for habeas corpus to
the district courts of their confinement,6 4 these increased applications
presented an acute problem in those districts wherein federal prisons
were located.6 5 This situation brought about considerable con-
55 14 Stat. 385 (1867). See cases cited note 35 supra.
56 See cases cited note 36 supra.
57 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (denial of counsel).
58 Peters, Collateral Attack by Habeas Corpts Upon Federal Judgments
in Criminal Cases, 23 WAsH. L. R~v. 87, 95 (1948).
59 During 1936 and 1937 an annual average of 310 applications were filed
in district courts and an average of 22 persons were released. In 1943, 1944,
and 1945 the annual average was 845 applications although only an average of
26 prisoners were released. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212 n.13
(1952). See statistics and comments in the following sources: Dorsey v. Gill,
148 F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945); Goodman, Use
and Abuwse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F.R-D. 313 (1948); Parker,
Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1949) (Judge Parker
was chairman of the committee which recommended § 2255) ; Speck, Statistics
on Federal Habeas Corpus, 10 Ouio ST. L.J. 337 (1949) (complete statistics).
6D Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224 (1924) ; see United States ex rel. Rob-
inson v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 649 (1942) (per curiam) ; Waley v. Johnston,
316 U.S. 101 (1942) ; Longsdorf, Habeas Corpus a Protean Writ and Remedy,
8 F.R.D. 179, 190 (1949). Although there is no res judicata in habeas corpus,
the court in the exercise of sound judicial discretion may generally refuse to
allow a prisoner to relitigate the validity of his sentence upon a question which
was presented or could have been presented in a prior proceeding. See Collins
v. United States, 206 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1953) ; Dorsey v. Gill, supra note 59,
at 869-70; Reviser's Note, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1958).
61 Waley v. Johnston, supra note 60.
62 See Goodman, supra note 59; Parker, supra note 59.
63 See United States v. Hayman, supra note 59, at 212-13; Barrett v. Hunter,
180 F.2d 510, 513 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 897 (1950) ; Dorsey v.
Gill, supra note 59, at 862; Goodman, supra note 59.
64 Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948); White v. United States, 190 F.2d
365 (6th Cir. 1951) (per curiam) ; see United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205,
213 (1952).
65 In 1947 and 1948 in Kansas habeas corpus constituted 26.8% of all cases
and 65.2% of all trials. Speck, Statistics on Federal Habeas Corpus, 10 Onxo
ST. L.J. 337, 350 (1949). "Of all habeas corpus applications filed by federal
prisoners, 63% were filed in but five of the eighty-four District Courts. And,
[ VOL. 34
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cern 66 and section 2255 67 was proposed 68 and enacted as a proce-
dural device to minimize the abuses and difficulties prevalent in the
administration of habeas corpus petitions filed by federal prisoners.6 9
There was no intention to restrict or broaden the prisoner's right of
collateral attack.70 The grounds which may be urged for relief by mo-
although habeas corpus trials average only 3%o of all trials in all districts, the
proportion of habeas corpus trials in those five districts has run from 20%
to as high as 65%o of all trials conducted in the district." United States v.
Hayman, supra note 64, at 214 n.18. Because the files and records of the trial
are at the sentencing court and not at the district court of confinement this
presented an added disadvantage. See United States v. Hayman, supra note
64, at 212-13.
66 See United States v. Hayman, supra note 64; Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d
857 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945); Parker, Limiting the
Abuse of Habeas Corputs, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1948); Note, 61 HARv. L. Rav. 657
(1948).
67 "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence
was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or
that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such senence, or that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise
subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence
to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
"A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
"Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show
that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to
be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon,
determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with
respect thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without
jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or other-
wise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringe-
ment of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment
vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment
aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial
or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.
"A court 'may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the
production of the prisoner at the hearing.
"The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or suc-
cessive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
"An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order entered
on the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas
corpus.
"An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who
is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not
be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief,
by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied
him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention." 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).
68 The Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges headed by Judge Parker
proposed the section. See Parker, supra note 66.
60 See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952); Longsdorf, Habeas
Corpus a Protean Writ and Renedy, 8 F.R1D. 179 (1949); Parker, supra note
66.
70 See United States v. Hayman, supra note 69; Longsdorf, supra note 69;
Parker, supra note 66.
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tion under section 2255 are the same as could be raised by habeas
corpus. 71 Although it was not intended to restrict the prisoner's
right of collateral attack, the following changes resulted:
(1) He now had to make his motion to the sentencing court
rather than applying to the district court of confinement.7 2
(2) His presence was no longer required at the hearing. 3
(3) The doctrine of res judicata was now applicable to suc-
cessive motions.74
(4) He no longer had a definite time guarantee on the hearing
but instead was assured a "prompt" hearing.75
(5) His right to proceed by habeas corpus was abolished unless
section 2255 was "inadequate or ineffective to test the legal-
ity of his detention." 76
71 See Clough v. Hunter, 191 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1951); Birtch v. United
States, 173 F.2d 316 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 944(1949). "The test, therefore, it seems to the Court, is whether the issue now
being raised could have been raised on an application for a writ of habeas
corpus . . . ." United States v. Meyers, 84 F. Supp. 766, 767 (D.D.C.), aff'd.
181 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 912 (1949); see Note, 59
YALE L.J. 1183 (1950).
7228 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958). See Birtch v. United States, mspra note 71.
In contrast, habeas corpus petitions are made to the district court of confine-
ment, and a filing in the district where sentenced instead of the district of
incarceration is insufficient. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948); White v.
United States, 190 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1951) (per curiam).
7328 U.S.C. §2255 (1958). See Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas
Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1948). In contrast, under habeas corpus the prisoner's
presence is mandatory if there is involved more than issues of law. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2243 (1958). "A basic consideration in habeas corpus practice is that the
prisoner will be produced before the court. This is the crux of the statutory
scheme established by the Congress; indeed, it is inherent in the very term
'habeas corpus."' Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 (1950) (Foot-
notes omitted.).
7428 U.S.C. §2255 (1958). "We have specifically held that the doctrine
of res judicata is applicable to a proceeding under Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255."
Lipscomb v. United States, 226 F.2d 812, 817 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 971, rehearing denied, 350 U.S. 1003 (1956). In contrast, under habeas
corpus res judicata is not applicable, Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230
(1924); see Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 214 (1950), though a second or
successive application may be denied in the exercise of sound judicial discre-
tion. See Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 869-70 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325
U.S. 890 (1945); Reviser's Note, 28 U.S.C. §2244 (1958).
7528 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958); see Note, 59 YALE L.J. 1183, 1188 (1950). In
contrast, under habeas corpus hearings must begin within five days of the
return. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1958).
7628 U.S.C. § 2255 (1959); Barrett v. Hunter, 180 F.2d 510 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 897 (1950); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205
(1952).
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Section 2255 as Construed
Section 2255 was challenged as an unconstitutional suspension
of the right to habeas corpus in Barrett v. Hunter.7  The Tenth
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of section 2255 by construing the
ex parte hearing provision to mean that the court does not have an
absolute discretion to entertain and determine the motion without
the presence of the prisoner:
Rather, we think the intention was to provide that the court may entertain
and determine the motion without requiring the production of the prisoner
when the motion or the records and files of the case conclusively show that
the prisoner is not entitled to any relief, or where the presence of the prisoner
is unnecessary to afford him the relief to which he is entitled, or where only
issues of law are presented. But where the motion and any response thereto
present material and substantial issues of fact requiring a hearing, generally,
in the exercise of a sound discretion, the court should require the production
of the prisoner.78
The ex parte hearing provision was given a similar construction
in the case of United States v. Haynan.79 The District Court had
conducted the hearing without the prisoner being physically present
and dismissed his motion. On appeal the Circuit Court treated sec-
tion 2255 as a nullity and dismissed the motion directing the prisoner
to proceed by habeas corpus in the district of his confinement.80 The
Supreme Court avoided passing directly on the constitutionality of
section 2255 by construing the ex parte hearing provision to mean:
"Where, as here, there are substantial issues of fact as to events in
which the prisoner participated, the trial court should require his
production for a hearing." 'I The Court, in concluding that the Dis-
trict Court did not proceed in conformity with section 2255 in deter-
mining the factual issues without notice to the prisoner and without
his presence, said:
We hold that the required hearing can be afforded respondent under the pro-
cedure established in Section 2255. The Court of Appeals correctly reversed
the order of the District Court but should have remanded the case for a
hearing under Section 2255 instead of ordering respondent's motion dismissed.8 2
-7 180 F.2d 510 (loth Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 897 (1950).
78 Barrett v. Hunter, supra note 76, at 514 (Footnotes omitted.). "We con-
clude that § 2255 thus construed preserves the essentials of the remedy afforded
by the great writ of freedom ... ." Barrett v. Hunter, supra note 76, at 516(Emphasis added.) (Huxman, J., dissented on the ground that to find consti-
tutionality where there is none is an unwarranted construction.).
79342 U.S. 205 (1952).
80 Hayman v. United States, 187 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1950).
81 United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952). To the same effect,
see Steinberg v. United States, 256 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1958) (per curiam);
United States v. Stevens, 224 F.2d 866 (3d Cir. 1955). That the issues must
he substantial and not feigned, see United States v. Shilitani, 16 F.R.D. 336
(S.D.N.Y. 1954).
82 United States v. Hayman, supra note 81, at 223-24.
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Although this construction appears to have guaranteed the constitu-
tionality of section 2255 it presented the problem of the sentencing
court ordering the presence of a prisoner confined in another district.
The court in a habeas corpus proceeding is powerless to do this; 8 in
a section 2255 proceeding it may invoke the authority of the all-writs
section of the Judicial Code.84 While the prisoner's presence is now
required where there are substantial issues of fact, a determination of
the motion without requiring the presence of the prisoner has pre-
sumptive validity and if the court erred in failing to order the
prisoner's presence it is at most error, and relief is by appeal and not
by habeas corpus claiming that section 2255 is inadequate to test the
detention.8 5
The res judicata provision of section 2255 has been given a simi-
lar liberal construction. In Barrett v. Hunter,8 6 the Tenth Circuit
construed this provision to mean that the court does not have an un-
qualified discretion to refuse to entertain a second or successive motion
but should dispose of the motion:
in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, guided and controlled by a con-
sideration of whatever has a rational bearing on the propriety of the relief
sought, among which is a prior refusal to grant relief on a like motion. If
the second or successive motion sets up new or dissimilar grounds for relief
which are within the purview of the grounds enumerated in the third para-
graph of § 2255, and the motion and the records and files in the case do not
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court should
ordinarily entertain such second or successive motion.87
This construction is in accord with the treatment of second or suc-
cessive applications in habeas corpus proceedings.88 Although it has
been declared that res judicata is applicable to section 2255 proceed-
ings, the reasons for dismissing the second or successive motion have
been the same as would justify a dismissal of a second or successive
habeas corpus application. 9 Dictum in a recent section 2255 case
83 See Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948) (Presence of the prisoner
within the district of the court is a prerequisite to habeas corpus.). Comment,
18 ALBANY L. REV. 13 (1954).
84 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1958). See United States v. Hayman, mtpra note
81, at 220-21.85 United States v. Winhoven, 14 F.R.D. 18 (S.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed,
209 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1953) ; see United States v. Hayman, supra note 81.86 180 F.2d 510 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 897 (1950).
87 Barrett v. Hunter, 180 F.2d 510, 514-15 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 897 (1950) (Footnotes omitted.). To the same effect, see Estep v.
United States, 251 F.2d 579, 583 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 854 (1958); United States v. Newman, 126 F. Supp. 94 (D.D.C. 1954).
88 See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942); Salinger v. Loisel, 265
U.S. 224 (1924); Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239 (1924).
89 Compare Lipscomb v. United States, 226 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 971, rehearing denied, 350 U.S. 1003 (1956) (§ 2255), with
Wong Doo v. United States, supra note 88 (habeas corpus), and Swihart v.
Johnston, 150 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 789 (1946)
(habeas corpus).
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before the Supreme Court indicates that even this lip service to
strict res judicata may disappear:
The statute further provides: "A motion for szwh relief may be made at any
time." This latter provision simply means that, as in habeas corpus, there is
no statute of limitations, no res judicata, and that the doctrine of laches is
inapplicable. 90
As a result of these cases it would seem that there is generally
no difference between the treatment of second or successive petitions
under section 2255 and under habeas corpus.
The last clause of section 2255, limiting the petitioner's right to
habeas corpus unless his remedy by motion is "inadequate or in-
effective to test the legality of his detention," originally resulted in
a difference of opinion as to whether section 2255 was a substitute for
habeas corpus save in those cases where section 2255 was "inadequate
or ineffective," 91 or whether practical compliance with section 2255
was merely a condition precedent to proceeding by habeas corpus.9 2
The prevailing view is that section 2255 is a substitute for habeas
corpus normally superseding it and providing the exclusive remedy for
federal prisoners where the issues in controversy are such as have tra-
ditionally been within the reach of habeas corpus.93 In view of the fact
that there have been only three cases 94 in which section 2255 has
been held "inadequate or ineffective" and these three cases seem to
have been overruled sub silentio,95 the issue as to whether section 2255
is a substitute or pre-requisite for habeas corpus seems settled.
It would seem that section 2255 is not only normally the exclusive
remedy but is always the exclusive remedy for federal prisoners
claiming the right to be released because of a jurisdictional or con-
stitutional defect at the trial.9 6
00 Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 420 (1959) (concurring opinion).
91 Birtch v. United States, 173 F.2d 316 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 337 U.S. 944 (1949) ; Howell v. United States, 172 F.2d 213 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 337 U.S. 906 (1949).
92 See St Clair v. Hiatt, 83 F. Supp. 585 (N.D. Ga. 1949), aff'd men., 177
F.2d 374 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950) ; United States v. Calp,
83 F. Supp. 152 (D. Md. 1949) ; Stidham v. Swope, 82 F. Supp. 931 (D. Cal.
1949) ; Wong v. Vogel, 80 F. Supp. 723 (E.D. Ky. 1948).
93 Rubenstein v. United States, 227 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 993 (1956); United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 212 F.2d 681(3d Cir. 1954).
94 Mugavero v. Swope, 86 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Cal. 1949), rev'd on other
grounds, 188 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1951) (habeas corpus granted before § 2255) ;
St. Clair v. Hiatt, sapra note 92 (habeas corpus granted after § 2255) ; Stidham
v. Swope, supra note 92 (habeas corpus granted before § 2255).92 All three cases were cited in Hayman v. United States, 187 F.2d 456 (9th
Cir. 1950), to sustain the inadequacy of § 2255. The case was reversed
in United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952). For a case illustrating how
meaningless the "inadequate or ineffective" clause has become, see United States
cx rel. Leguillou v. Davis, supra note 93, holding that the fact that a sentencing
court judge may have to review his own actions at the trial does not make§ 2255 inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the detention.
96 Had not § 2255 been so liberally construed, a broader interpretation and
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Other Post-Conviction Remedies Distinguished
Section 2255 was thought for a time to be a substitute for the
ancient writ of error coram nobis.9 7 This is attributable in part to
the Reviser's Note to section 2255 to the effect that the section
"restates, clarifies and simplifies the procedure in the nature of the
ancient writ of error coram nobis." os This Note is misleading since
section 2255 was enacted not to adopt coram nobis but to provide a
procedural remedy to correct the abuses in federal prisoners' habeas
corpus applications. 9 Furthermore, the same grounds have to be
asserted under section 2255 as under habeas corpus.1 00 The pro-
cedure is similar to coram nobis only in that the attack is made to
the sentencing court after judgment. 0 ' The Supreme Court in
United States v. Morgan,10 2 in a five to four decision, held that sec-
tion 2255 did not preclude use of coram nobis in the federal courts. 0 3
Respondent sought by motion under section 2255 to have a federal
conviction set aside although he had served his full term. After
serving his sentence he had been convicted of a New York offense
and was sentenced to a longer term as a second offender because of
his prior federal conviction. Under section 2255 the petitioner has
to be in custody under the sentence he is attacking.04 However, the
Court treated the motion under section 2255 as an application for a
writ of error coram nobis and went into the merits. Although there
was no statute specifically providing for coram nobis it was held that
the power to grant the writ must come from the all-writs section of
the Judicial Code. 10 5 The result of the decision is that even after
use of the "inadequate or ineffective" clause might have resulted. See Note,
59 YALE L.J. 1183, 1189 (1950).
97 United States v. Calp, 83 F. Supp. 152 (D. Md. 1949) ; United States v.
Morris, 83 F. Supp. 970, 971 (D.D.C. 1949); see United States v. Kerschman,
201 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Note, 33 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 98, 101 (1958).98 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1952). The confusion can be exemplified by this state-
ment from United States v. Kranz, 86 F. Supp. 776 (D.N.J. 1949), "§ 2255 of
Title 28 U.S.C.A. is in the nature of an application for a writ of error coram
nobis and is governed by the general principles applicable to habeas corpus."
Id. at 777.
99 See note 69 supra and accompanying text.100 See authorities cited notes 70 and 71 supra.
101 See Donnelly, Unconvicting the Innwcent, 6 VAD. L. REv. 20, 29 (1952);
Longsdorf, The Federal Habeas Corpus Acts Original and Amended, 13 F.R.D.
407, 422 (1953).
102346 U.S. 502 (1954).
103 United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1954). FmD. R. Civ. P.
60(b), expressly abolishing coram nobis in civil cases, was held inapplicable
because this motion was a step in a criminal proceeding. Id. at 505 n.4. But
see Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418 n.7 (1959), where § 2255
is considered an independent civil suit and not a proceeding in the original
criminal prosecution.
104 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958). Heflin v. United States, supra note 103. United
States v. Lavelle, 194 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1952).105 United States v. Morgan, supra note 103, at 505. "The Supreme Court
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the term is served there is an effective means of obtaining relief from
an invalid conviction. Prior to this decision there had been con-
siderable concern about the lack of an adequate remedy against the
consequences of conviction which extend beyond the period of
custody.'0 6 In a recent case the petitioner had been in prison under
the sentence he was attacking at the time he commenced proceedings
under section 2255 but by the time certiorari had been granted he
had been released. The Supreme Court went into the merits of the
case.' 0 7 The significance of the case seems to be that although the
petitioner must be in custody when he begins section 2255 proceed-
ings 108 he need not be in custody to have the motion determined on
the merits.1 9
Under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a
motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence
may be made within two years after final judgment."i 0  The scope
of inquiry extends only to guilt or innocence"1 and the court has no
jurisdiction to entertain a motion after the two-year period. 1 2 Under
section 2255 a motion may be made at any time petitioner is in cus-
tody under the sentence he is attacking." 3  The question of guilt or
innocence is not a proper issue under section 2255 and the discovery
of new evidence which establishes innocence but does not show a
jurisdictional or constitutional defect is not sufficient grounds for
section 2255.1 4  If the evidence is discovered after two years and it
does not show a denial of a constitutional right nor a jurisdictional
and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary
or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1958).
106 Some specific examples of post-conviction consequences are: loss of civil
rights, multiple offender statutes, and social and economic repercussions. See
Donnelly, Unconvicting the Innocent, 6 VAND. L. Ray. 20, 29-30 (1952) ; Note,
63 YALE L.J. 115 (2953); Note, 59 YALE LJ. 786, 789-90 (1950).
107 Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957); see also Dickson v.
Castle, 244 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1957).
10828 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958); United States v. Lavelle, supra note 104.
109The Court distinguishes United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954),
but relies on the consequences extending beyond the period of custody argu-
ment employed in the Morgan case. Pollard v. United States, supra note 107,
at 358.
110 FED. R_ Ciu. P. 33.
ill See Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 687, rehearing denied, 314 U.S. 716 (1942).
112 Marion v. United States, 171 F.2d 185 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S.
944 (1949).
113 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).
114 United States v. Kaplan, 101 F. Supp. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); see Howell
v. United States, 172 F.2d 213 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 906 (1949);
cf. Shaver v. Ellis, 255 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1958) (per curiam).
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defect, the only remedy is by executive clemency, 115 or possibly by
coram nobis.16
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 117 may be
maintained only on the grounds that the indictment does not charge
a crime, or that the court had no jurisdiction.118 "The motion in
arrest of judgment shall be made within five days after determination
of guilt or within such further time as the court may fix during the
5-day period." 119 The scope of inquiry is limited to a defect ap-
pearing on the face of the record, 1 20 and the record includes only the
plea, the verdict, and the sentence.' 2 ' Any ruling, the validity of
which depends upon the evidence taken at the trial, is not reviewable
by a motion in arrest of judgment under Rule 34.122 The petitioner
need not be in custody under Rule 34.123 Under section 2255 there
are much broader grounds of attack,'124 and the scope of inquiry ex-
tends to matters dehors the record.' 2 5  The petitioner must be in
custody under the sentence he is attacking' and there is no time
limit on the motion.12 7
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, allowing
the correction of an illegal sentence at any time, 28 covers no other
error in a criminal record than the correction of a sentence, the im-
position of which was not authorized by the judgment of conviction. 29
It merely affords a procedure for bringing an improper sentence im-
posed upon a valid conviction into conformity with law. 3 0  It was
115 United States v. Kaplan, supra note 114. For an interesting discussion
of the Kaplan case, see Donelly, Unconvicting the Innocent, 6 VAND. L. REV.
20 (1952).
116 Cf. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954). See also Note, 63
YALE L.J. 115 (1953).
117 FED. R. CRIM. P. 34.
11SIbid. United States v. Bradford, 194 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 979 (1952).
119 FED. R. CaIm. P. 34. See United States v. Bradford, supra note 118;
Marion v. United States, 171 F.2d 185 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 944
(1949).
120 United States v. Zisblatt, 172 F.2d 740, 741-42 (2d Cir. 1949).
121 United States v. Bradford, supra note 118; see United States v. Caplan,
123 F. Supp. 862 (W.D. Pa. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 222 F.2d 875
(3d Cir. 1955).
122 United States v. Zisblatt, supra note 120.
123 United States v. Bradford, 194 F.2d 197 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
944 (1949).
12428 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958). See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205
(1952).
125 See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942) (habeas corpus).
12628 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958). United States v. Lavelle, 194 F.2d 202 (2d
Cir. 1952).
12728 U.S.C. §2255 (1958).
12
8 FED. R. CRim. P. 35.
129 See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506 (1954) (dictum) ; United
States v. Bradford, 194 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 979
(1952) (dictum).
130 Duggins v. United States, 240 F.2d 479 (6th Cir. 1957) ; Cook v. United
States, 171 F.2d 567 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 926 (1949).
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not meant to meet the problems in a habeas corpus proceeding or a
collateral attack upon a judgment. 131 Section 2255 is available only
to attack a sentence under which the petitioner is in custody; relief
under Rule 35 is available not only where the petitioner is in custody
but also where he is not in custody, at least where matters dehors
the record are not involved.' 3 2  Under Rule 35, the illegal sentence
may be corrected where the defendant has not actually started serving
sentence,133 or where the defendant already served his sentence.' 34
Under section 2255 the petitioner must be claiming the right to be
released and he has no right to have the validity of his sentence
adjudicated if he would still be confined in the same penitentiary
under another existing sentence.' 35 Rule 35 does not guarantee re-
lease if successful but merely provides a procedure for bringing the
sentence into conformity with the law. 136
Rule 36, providing for the correction of clerical mistakes in
judgments at any time,'3 is not an independent and collateral attack
upon judgments as they stand as in section 2255. The judgments to
be corrected are not necessarily void judgments subject to collateral
attack. 38
Conchision
Section 2255, as interpreted by the courts, has lost much of the
administrative effectiveness which prompted its passage. The res
judicata provision has been interpreted to mean the same as the
"sound discretion" norm applicable to traditional habeas corpus pro-
ceedings.' 39 Thus, the anticipated remedy against second or successive
motions does not exist. Although the constitutionality of section
2255 has been assured by construing the ex parte hearing provision
to mean that the petitioner's presence is required where there are
substantial issues of fact, this construction presents other problems.
It may be necessary to make expensive and time-consuming arrange-
ments for the transportation of the prisoner to the sentencing court,
131 Duggins v. United States, supra note 130.
132 Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959).
133 Holloway v. United States, 191 F.2d 504, 507 (D.D.C. 1951); Duggins
v. United States, mupra note 130.
134 United States v. Bradford, 194 F.2d 197 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
979 (1952).
135 Oughton v. United States, 215 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1954) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 975 (1957); Winhoven v. United States, 209 F.2d 417
(9th Cir. 1953).
136 Duggins v. United States, 240 F.2d 479 (6th Cir. 1957); Cook v. United
States, 171 F.2d 567 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 926 (1949).
13 7 FE. R. Ca n. P. 36.
138 See Chapman v. United States, 247 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 945 (1958); Duggins v. United States, 240 F.2d 479, 483 (6th Cir.
1957).
139 See cases cited notes 88 and 89 szpra; Longsdorf, The Federal Habeas
Corpua Acts Original and Amended, 13 F.R.D. 407, 424 (1953).
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which may be a considerable distance from the court of confinement.140
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the distance to be traveled to the dis-
trict court is relatively short and the same for all prisoners. Further-
more, in habeas corpus, the prisoner is guaranteed a hearing within
five days after the writ is returned. 141 The only time limitation in a
section 2255 proceeding is that a "prompt hearing" must be granted,
142
and where the petitioner is brought from a distant prison there may
be considerable delay.
Requiring the prisoner to make his motion to the sentencing
court rather than to the district court of confinement places him at
a distinct disadvantage. Despite the advantage of having the files,
records and witnesses at the sentencing court, the disadvantages to
the prisoner are more compelling. In addition to the fact that the
prisoner's hearing may be considerably delayed if his presence is re-
quired, where his presence is not required he may have to communi-
cate with his attorney by mail, a method less conducive to a full
disclosure than direct interview. Where there is only one district
court judge, the judge may be passing on his own actions at the
trial,143 and, even in those districts having more than one judge, a
brother judge may be reluctant to overrule his associate. The atmos-
phere of the sentencing court would seem to be less objective than
the detached attitude of the uninterested district court of confinement.
The construction given section 2255 has resulted in its becoming the
prisoner's exclusive remedy, leaving him no hope of proceeding by
habeas corpus in the district court of confinement by a showing that
section 2255 is inadequate.
In an effort to conform section 2255 to the substance of habeas
corpus, the courts have destroyed most of the procedural effectiveness.
It would seem that the only remaining advantages are that the files,
records and witnesses need not be called to the district courts of con-
finement. and the district courts of confinement are no longer over-
burdened with applications for relief.' 44 By repealing section 2255
140 E.g., Stidham v. Swope, 82 F. Supp. 931 (D. Cal. 1949).
141 "The writ . . . shall be directed to the person having custody of the
person detained. It shall be returned within three days unless for good cause
additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed. . . . When the writ
... is returned a day shall be set for a hearing, not more than five days after
the return unless for good cause additional time is allowed." 28 U.S.C. § 2243
(1958).
142 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).
'3 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 212 F.2d 681 (3d Cir.
1954). Even this situation does not render § 2255 "inadequate or ineffective"
to test the legality of detention. Ibid.144 Since the enactment of § 2255 there has been some decrease in the
number of habeas corpus cases filed in the districts wherein federal prisons
are located. (Note, however, that there has been an increase in Kansas where
the overburdening prior to § 2255 caused considerable concern. See note
65 .rupra.) The following statistics are contained in a letter from Joseph F.
Spaniol, Jr., Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to St. John's
Law Review, Nov. 5, 1959:
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and by special assignment providing more judges in district courts
of confinement, 45 the burden on these courts would still be alleviated
and the more compelling disadvantages of requiring the petitioner to
file at the sentencing court would no longer exist.
M
MARITIME CASES AND THE "FEDERAL QUESTION"
Exercise of the original jurisdiction of the lower federal courts
on a "federal question" basis has been vexing the judiciary ever since
the United States Supreme Court attempted to define the scope of
the constitutional grant of power in Osborn v. Bank of the United
States." Except for an abortive attempt to authorize such jurisdiction
in 1801,2 the power given Congress by Article III of the Constitution
to invest the inferior federal courts with jurisdiction to enforce rights
arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States was not
exercised until the vast expansion of federal power after the Civil
War, in the Judiciary Act of 1875,3 section 1 of which is the pred-
ecessor of the present section 1331 of Title 28 of the United States
Code.4
Not the least vexatious of the problems surrounding the inter-
pretation of section 1331 has been a recent controversy r as to its
fundamental scope, and indeed as to the interpretation to be given
Article III itself. The controversy has centered around the juris-
District habeas corpus cases filed habeas corpus cases filed
1945-48 1955-58
Pennsylvania 47 34
Georgia 321 201Indiana 24 20
Kansas 314 532California 161 89Washington 116 64
15 28 U.S.C. § 292 (1958) dealing with assignment of judges would authorize
such special assignments.
19 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738 (1824).
2 Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 92, repealed by Act of March 8,
1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132.
3 Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.4 "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 ex-
clusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1958).
5 It arose over a theory advanced in a dictum by Judge Magruder inJansson v. Swedish American Line, 185 F.2d 212, 217 (1st Cir. 1950). Fourdays later the Third Circuit rejected the theory in Jordine v. Walling, 185
F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1950).
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